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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to present a generalized hole argument
for gauge field theories and their geometrical setting in terms of fiber bundles. The
generalized hole argument is motivated and extended from the spacetime hole argu-
ments which appear in spacetime theories based on differentiable manifolds such as
general relativity. Analogously, the generalized hole argument rules out fiber bun-
dle substantivalism and, thus, a relationalistic interpretation of the geometry of fiber
bundle spaces is favoured. Along the way, the concept of gauge field theories will be
analyzed via considering the gauge principle and thereby hopefully clarifying certain
terminological ambiguities.
1 Introduction
There can be no doubt: gauge field theories (for short, ‘gauge theories’), nowadays, provide a
most powerful tool in modern physics with regard to a unification of the four known interaction
forces. In this connection, the so-called gauge principle lays the foundation of these theories
in terms of an elegant derivation of the interaction coupling. The principle works by satisfying
a gauge postulate, the heartpiece of any gauge theory, which demands the theory’s invariance
under local gauge transformations of the matter fields. Unfortunately, we are far away from
a proper understanding of the gauge principle’s conceptual meaning – it actually works just
heuristically. But since the theoretical and, most of all, experimental success of the gauge
approach is hardly understandable as pure coincidence, we are challenged with a deep physical
and philosophical problem.
It is well known that gauge field theories allow a natural mathematical description in the
framework of fiber bundles, which may therefore be considered as an enlarged geometrical arena
of physics. Thus, from the philosopher’s point of view a first step into a better understanding
could be made by analyzing the status of this geometry and its internal spaces. This paper
will deal with these questions in terms of a confrontation of relationalism vs. substantivalism
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with regard to bundle spaces. First, I will consider the concepts of the gauge principle, gauge
transformations, and gauge freedom. After introducing fiber bundles I propose a definition of
the notion of gauge field theory. I will, finally, turn to the spacetime hole argument, and will
propose a generalized bundle-space hole argument, which rules out fiber bundle substantivalism.
2 The gauge principle
We start from the empirical fact that there exist certain conserved quantities in nature. Actually,
Noether’s theorem1 tells us that, given any global symmetry, there is a corresponding conserved
quantity.
Noether’s theorem. Let φi(x) be some field variable (with general index i
of the field components). Then the invariance of the action functional S[φ] =∫
L (φi(x), ∂µφi(x)) d
4x under some k-dimensional Lie group leads to the existence
of k conserved currents.
As a paradigm case I shall consider the free Dirac field ψ(x) with the Lagrangian density
LD = ψ¯(x) (iγ
µ∂µ −m) ψ(x). (1)
Clearly, the free Dirac Lagrangian is form invariant under global gauge transformations of the
spinor wavefunctions,
ψ(x)→ ψ′(x) = eiqαψ(x), ψ¯(x)→ ψ¯′(x) = e−iqαψ¯(x), (2)
with some arbitrary constant phase parameter α and charge q. The Noether current corre-
sponding to the transformations (2) is given by
µ = −q ψ¯(x)γµψ(x). (3)
It satisfies the continuity equation,
∂µ
µ = 0, (4)
which expresses the conservation of charge. In order to identify q in (3) empirically with the
elementary charge e, we have to couple the Dirac particle – perhaps an electron – to the
electromagnetic field. Thus, the free Lagrangian, which is an idealization anyway, must be
replaced by some Lagrangian describing interaction. Miraculously, it turns out that this coupling
can in fact be derived just by postulating the invariance of (1) under local gauge transformations
instead of the corresponding global ones (2).
Gauge postulate. The Lagrangian of a free matter field φi(x) should remain in-
variant under local gauge transformations φi(x)→ φ
′
i(x) = φ
′
i (φi(x), αs(x)).
1I refer to Emmy Noether’s first theorem simply as Noether’s theorem, whereas her second theorem, which is
related to infinite symmetry transformations, i.e. transformations with arbitrary functions instead of parameters,
for these purposes will be better described in terms of local gauge transformations, which in fact play the central
role in gauge theories.
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To see ‘how the miracle occurs’ in the example, we consider the free Dirac equation2
(iγµ∂µ −m)ψ(x) = 0. (5)
Due to the gauge postulate we have to replace (2) by
ψ(x)→ ψ′(x) = eiqα(x)ψ(x) (6)
with a local, i.e. spacetime dependent, phase function α(x). Obviously (5) is not invariant under
this local gauge transformation. If we, however, identify
Aµ(x) = −∂µα(x) (7)
and thereby introduce a coupling field, which itself satisfies the local gauge transformations
Aµ(x)→ A
′
µ(x) = Aµ(x)− ∂µα(x), (8)
we may get a new interaction equation
(iγµ∂µ −m)ψ(x) = q γ
µAµ(x) ψ(x). (9)
This equation is indeed invariant under the combined transformations (6) and (8).
Formally it seems reasonable to identify Aµ with the electromagnetic potential
3, since the
construction of a field strength tensor (as the derivative of the potential) which is invariant
under (8) gives
Fµν(x) = ∂µAν(x)− ∂νAµ(x). (10)
This tensor satisfies the vacuum Maxwell equations
∂µFµν(x) = 0 (11)
and, as a Bianchi identity,
∂[µFνρ](x) = 0. (12)
Maxwell’s equations follow from the Lagrangian of the free electromagnetic field
LEM = −
1
4
Fµν(x)F
µν(x). (13)
The coupling can explicitly be seen by introducing a covariant derivative
∂µ → Dµ = ∂µ − iqAµ(x) (14)
and therefore
Lint = −µ(x)A
µ(x). (15)
Since
(iγµDµ −m) ψ(x) = 0 (16)
is equivalent to (9), the coupling of matter and interaction fields can be derived in just one step
via (14), thereby satisfying the gauge postulate by means of
LD → L
′ = LD + Lint. (17)
2This is the Euler-Lagrange equation belonging to (1).
3The experimental evidence for this maneuver is usually seen in the existence of the Aharonov-Bohm effect,
which should justify the crucial identification (7).
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Gauge principle. The coupling of the Noether current corresponding to the global
gauge transformations of the Lagrangian of free matter fields can be introduced via
replacing the usual derivative by the covariant derivative ∂µ → Dµ corresponding to
local gauge transformations.
Now, the merit of the concept of gauge field theories in modern physics becomes evident since
the gauge principle provides a most successful and elegant ‘recipe’ for introducing interaction,
e.g. in our example deriving from the free theory (1) via (6) the coupling structure of quantum
electrodynamics,4
LQED = LD + LEM + Lint. (18)
3 Gauge transformations and gauge freedom
As we have seen, quantum electrodynamics can be understood as a gauge field theory proper
with gauge group U(1), since the gauge transformations occuring are global and local U(1)
transformations. Unfortunately, the usage of the terms ‘gauge theory’ and ‘gauge transforma-
tions’ is by no means uniform throughout the literature, which sometimes leads to conceptual
confusions. In order to clarify the terminology I shall make some necessary distinctions:
1. Global gauge transformations, also called ‘gauge transformations of the first kind’ (GT1),
with corresponding gauge group G1.
2. Local gauge transformations, also called ‘gauge transformations of the second kind’ (GT2),
with corresponding gauge group G2.
On closer inspection of GT2 one should distinguish two kinds:
2a. Matter field5 transformations, hereby called ‘type a’ gauge transformations of the second
kind (GT2a).
2b. Gauge field6 transformations, hereby called ‘type b’ gauge transformations of the second
kind (GT2b).
Regarding the example from the preceeding section the GT2a are given by (6), whereas the
GT2b are given by (8). Usually the GT1-GT2 distinction is made, seldom however GT2a-GT2b.
One exception is for instance Wolfgang Pauli, who in an early influential article concerning
the gauge approach in relativistic field theories indicates the GT2a-GT2b distinction, however
calling it “... gauge transformations of the first ... and ... of the second type” (Pauli 1941,
p.207). I very much agree with Pauli in regarding this as an important distinction, which is, as
4In order to obtain full quantum electrodynamics the fields ψ(x), ψ¯(x), and Aµ(x) have to be quantized.
5This is the usual terminology, although there may exist fundamental particle fields with mass zero such as,
perhaps, neutrinos – ‘energy-matter field’ is certainly the more precise term.
6This is again the usual terminology, although ‘gauge potential’ is more precise. The derivative gives the gauge
field strength.
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he points out, “... manifested through the fact that only expressions which are bilinear in U and
U∗ [comparable with the matter fields ψ and ψ¯ in (1)] are associated with physically measurable
quantities ...” and “... that, in principle, only gauge invariant quantities can be obtained by
direct measurement”.7 Moreover, the structure of the GT2b – although they already appear in
the free Maxwell theory (13) – is forced by the structure of the GT2a, thus, expressing the
‘miracle’ of the gauge principle in other terms: the gauge field appears as an appendix of the
matter field!
In addition to the 3-fold distinction (GT1, GT2a, GT2b) concerning the usage of the notion
of ‘gauge transformation’, the term ‘gauge theory’ should be clarified. It is already a common
practice to call classical electrodynamics, i.e. the free Maxwell theory, a gauge theory. This
is due to the fact that (13) is form invariant under the GT2b transformations (8). But this is
certainly a misleading terminology, since we better should refer to this invariance as a gauge
freedom of the theory, whereas only the combined Dirac-Maxwell theory, i.e. quantum elec-
trodynamics (18), is to be considered as a true gauge theory. Note that the same argument
also holds for the diffeomorphism invariance of our known spacetime theories. Whether general
relativity, for instance, may nonetheless be considered as a gauge theory is another question and
should not be confused with the obvious gauge freedom concerning the group of diffeomorphisms
of the spacetime manifold. Thus, a theory comprising some gauge freedom is not yet a gauge
theory, but only a theory incorporating the gauge principle.
4 The fiber bundle structure of gauge theories
I shall recall the definition of a fiber bundle 〈E,M, π,F, G〉 with bundle space E, base man-
ifold M, projection map π : E → M, fiber space F, and structure group G – compare
e.g. (Nakahara 1990). Fiber bundles can be considered as generalizations of direct prod-
uct spaces, locally looking like M× F. Thus, a local trivialisation is given by a diffeomorphic
map φi : Ui ×F→ π
−1(Ui) within some open set Ui ⊂M. In order to obtain the global bundle
structure the local charts φi must be glued together via transition functions tij(p) = φ
−1
i,p ◦ φj,p
with φi,p(f) ≡ φi(p, f), p ∈ M, f ∈ F. A bundle section is a mapping s : M→ E and can be
considered as a generalization of a tangent vector field. With π (s(p)) = p the section s(p) ∈ Fp
is local. A bundle is called trivial, if it admits a global section. In physics two classes of bundles
play a central role. If the fiber is given by some n dimensional linear vector space Vn the bundle
is called a vector bundle E(M,Vn, GL(n,V)). For Vn = Rn the general structure group is
G = GL(n,R). For principal bundles P(M, G) the fiber is itself a Lie group F ≡ G with a
natural action on the bundle from the right, P×G→ P. To any principal bundle there naturally
exists an associated vector bundle with the same structure group and transition functions.
7Pauli was always concerned by questions relating to the measurability of quantized fields. Already in (Pauli
1933, p. 579) he noticed “... daß fu¨r das Photonfeld ... der Begriff der raum-zeitlich-lokalen Teilchendichte
W (~x, t) nicht sinnvoll existiert” [ ... that for the photon field ... the notion of a particle density W (~x, t) located
in space-time has no meaningful existence]. This is due to the fact that the four current for the photon field
identically vanishes, νEM = ∂µFˆ
µν = 0, which has considerable consequences for the interpretation of quantum
fields. Since there is no local conservation law for the number of photons, the concept of a well-defined particle
density is not in the same sense meaningful for the photon gauge field as it is for the Dirac matter field (Lyre
1996).
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It is crucial for our considerations to understand that the geometrical framework of fiber
bundles provides indeed a natural mathematical setting for the representation of physical gauge
field theories. It turns out that any of the four fundamental interactions can be represented
within the framework of a principal bundle. For instance, quantum electrodynamics in section 2
is to be considered as a U(1) gauge field theory with a trivial bundle P(R(1,3),S1) – the triviality
of this bundle being due to the fact that Minkowskian spacetime R(1,3) is contractible. Within
the fiber bundle language, gauge physical notions obey the following dictionary: A matter field is
given as a section s in the associated vector bundle (E(R(1,3),C, U(1)) in our example). In order
to describe the gauge potential the concept of a bundle connection ω is needed: ω is a 1-form
with values in the Lie algebra g of the structure group G which defines a unique decomposition
TP = VP ⊕ HP of the tangent space TP of the principal bundle P into a ‘vertical’ and a
‘horizontal’ part. Note that the vertical subspace VP is isomorphic to g. Hence, the Dirac-
Maxwell gauge potential can be represented as A = s∗ω = Aµdx
µ, where s∗ is the pull back.
The local gauge transformations (8), which stem from the transition functions tij above, may in
general be written as ω′ = g−1ωg + g−1dg with g ∈ G. Thus, the structure group serves as the
gauge group.
It is important to note that, again, this terminology is not uniform. Due to the local
gauge postulate the gauge group consists of spacetime-dependent group elements and is, thus,
infinite dimensional. Therefore sometimes the gauge group is to be considered as a subgroup
G ⊂ Aut(P) of the automorphism group of P. The ‘pure gauge transformations’, which preserve
the connection, are then given by the group Go of just the vertical automorphisms. This is of
particular interest when considering general relativity as a gauge theory. Here, the bundle
structure is given by the orthonormal frame bundle LoM (sometimes called tetrad bundle since
the frames are orthonormalized tetrads) with the homogeneous Lorentz group as structure
group. Trickily, as authors like Andrzej Trautman have pointed out (Trautman 1980), in
general relativity the ‘gauge group’ G is simply isomorphic to the diffeomorphism group Diff(M)
of the spacetime manifold M, whereas the group of ‘pure gauge transformations’ shrinks to the
identity Go = id. Although this is certainly an important characteristic of general relativity, I
prefer calling the structure group the gauge group – in contrast to G as the group of local gauge
transformations. In gravitational gauge theories this refers to the central conceptual importance
of tetradial reference frames, which are locally free to rotate and translate due to the structure
group. Therefore sometimes general relativity can alternatively be considered as a translational
gauge theory, since the tetrads represent the gauge potentials of the translation group isomorphic
to R(1,3). In this case the corresponding Noether currents are given by the energy-momentum
density current, a procedure which exactly mimics the way the gauge principle works.8
I shall now claim – as an important feature of any gauge approach – that the local gauge
transformations GT2 only allow for an active interpretation. This can directly be seen from
the gauge postulate. More precisely, this point of view holds inherently for the local gauge
transformations of the matter fields GT2a, whereas the gauge fields turn out to be a consequence
8These questions are closely related to the fact that in general relativity the fiber is soldered to the base
manifold, which indicates the most important conceptual difference from quantum gauge field theories. Moreover,
it seems quite natural to extend the structure group, which leads to generalized theories of gravitation – most of
them including torsion. Thus, orthodox general relativity fits into the gauge theoretic framework although this
framework forces one to think about more general structures – compare (Hehl et al. 1995) for an overview.
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of this postulate (which is the very idea of the gauge principle). In general relativity, ‘matter
fields’ are represented in terms of reference frames. We therefore are forced to think about
reference frames as the building blocks of gravitational gauge theories (Hehl 1994) – even more
so in encountering quantum gravity (Rovelli 1991).
Concluding this, the following definition of gauge field theories can be given:
Definition. We call a gauge field theory any theory being derived from the gauge
principle and representing the geometry of a principal fiber bundle. The gauge group
is given by the structure group of the bundle.
5 Hole arguments till now
In 1913-1914, during his crucial years of developing general relativity, Einstein claimed mis-
takenly that the new theory might not be generally covariant, i.e. form invariant under general
coordinate transformations. He tried to convince himself by the so-called “Lochbetrachtung”,
i.e. by considering a hole in the matter energy distribution where Tµν = 0, which would lead to
the possibility of describing the metric gµν via, in modern terminology, different diffeomorphic
tensors – a possibility which for Einstein seemed to contradict the law of causality. This is the
first famous “hole argument” and its historical and philosophical background has been scruti-
nized in detail – see e.g. (Norton 1984), (Stachel 1989). For the purpose of this paper only
the structure of the argument will be of interest. It can be repeated in two steps:
1. Leibniz equivalence of diffeomorphic models of usual spacetime theories (general covari-
ance): In the relationalist’s view, diffeomorphic models of any spacetime theory making
use of the concept of smooth manifolds to represent spacetime are equivalent with regard
to any observation, i.e. they represent one and the same physical situation.
2. Failure of determinism: The substantivalist’s assumption of an existence of spacetime
points independent from the matter content of spacetime leads to an indeterminism by
considering different diffeomorphic models of a theory whose predictions cannot be used
to make out any empirical distinction between the ‘different’ models. Thus, indeterminism
arises due to the substantivalist’s denying of Leibniz equivalence.
In 1987, John Earman and John Norton presented a new hole argument following this
2-step structure, which is valid for the whole class of spacetime theories containing diffeo-
morphic models (Earman and Norton 1987). In general, such a model is given by a tupel
〈M, O1, ...On〉 with a spacetime manifoldM and quantities O1, ...On denoting certain geometric
objects. Thus, a model of general relativity is given by M = 〈M, gµν , Tµν〉 with metric gµν and
energy-momentum tensor Tµν . The authors claim a gauge theorem which reads as follows:
“Gauge Theorem (General covariance): If 〈M, O1, ...On〉 is a model of a local space-
time theory and h is a diffeomorphism from M to M, then the carried along tu-
ple 〈M, h∗O1, ...h
∗On〉 is also a model of the theory.”(Earman and Norton 1987,
p. 520)
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Recall that any diffeomorphism f : M→M induces a map (carry along) f∗ : Vp → Vf(p)
at points p ∈ M, which means that any tensor T given in the coordinates
{
xi
}
of Vp is also
given as f∗T in new coordinates
{
yi
}
of Vf(p). Hence, the model f
∗M = 〈M, f∗gµν , f
∗Tµν〉
is Leibniz equivalent to M , i.e. M and f∗M are empirically indistinguishable. This is the
first part of the argument. For the second part Earman und Norton chose a special “hole
diffeomorphism h” with
h = id, t ≤ to, and h 6= id, t > to, (19)
which, of course, obeys usual smoothness and differentiability conditions at to. Hence, we have
M = h∗M for times t ≤ to, whereas M 6= h
∗M for t > to. Since the spacetime substantivalist
must claim that at to the world splits into two physically distinct modelsM and h
∗M – although
the theory cannot predict any empirical difference –, for him a radical inherent indeterminism
arises.
It is important to note that Earman and Norton for the first step of the argument consider
active point transformations instead of mere passive coordinate transformations. They indicate
this by the term “gauge theorem”, which they explain by quoting Robert Wald: “... the
diffeomorphisms comprise the gauge freedom of any theory formulated in terms of tensor fields
on a spacetime manifold” (Wald 1984, p. 438). Thus, by converting the notion of general
covariance into an active language of point transformations, the hole argument becomes vivid.
After all, we are confronted with the following alternatives in order to escape the hole argu-
ment: either to give up spacetime substantivalism, or to accept indeterminism as a consequence
of any generally covariant spacetime theory. But the latter way out, Earman und Norton
close, seems to be “... far too heavy a price to pay for saving a doctrine that adds nothing
empirically to spacetime theories” (Earman and Norton 1987, p. 524).
6 The generalized hole argument
The above manifold hole argument rules out spacetime substantivalism for orthodox spacetime
theories including general relativity. As shown in section 4, in gauge field theories one naturally
has to take into account the enlarged geometrical arena of the underlying fiber bundles to
represent matter and gauge fields. The question arises, which kind of status is appropriate for
to the geometry of fiber bundles. In particular: Does a relationalistic or a substantivalistic point
of view hold? In order to rule out the latter one, I argue in the following that there exists
a straightforward extension of the spacetime manifold hole argument to a generalized bundle
space hole argument.
One first of all should ask whether there exist reasons at all for believing in fiber bundle
substantivalism. Since the spacetime hole argument already rules out manifold substantivalism,
the fiber bundle substantivalist will claim the independent existence of fiber spaces as internal
geometrical spaces in which matter and gauge fields ‘live’. First, this is the decisive argument for
the general need of fiber bundles: Fields do not live in spacetime itself; rather, they live in state
spaces defined on spacetime.9 As indicated in section 4, at each spacetime point we need two
9This statement surely holds for quantum gauge field theories in our standard model. Whether this is even
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additional spaces constituting the geometrical arena of our world: A group space constituting
the state space of gauge fields, which is provided by some principal bundle P, and a vector
space for matter fields, provided by the associated vector bundle E. Now, the fiber bundle
substantivalist will consider bundle, or at least fiber-space points (if he has already accepted
the spacetime hole argument) as individuated substances. Analogous to the usual spacetime
substantivalist’s emphasis on the existence of vacuum solutions in general relativity, the fiber
space substantivalist could point out the activity and effectiveness of the vacuum in quantum
gauge field theories. Indeed, Yuval Ne’eman claims, that “... the vacuum is ... the arena for
the nonlinear interaction of the gauge fields. As a result, spacetime is a physical entity – as a set
of fields – at the classical level already.” Therefore, “... physics selects the realist or substantivist
view, and contradict[s] the tenets of relationalism or conventionalism, with respect to spacetime
...” (Ne’eman 1995). Curiously enough, Ne’eman applies his argument to spacetime alone
– obviously ignoring the spacetime hole argument –, although, if at all, his argument should a
fortiori hold for fiber spaces, too.
I shall now confront these points of view with the relationalist’s arguments. This will be
done in the same two steps as for the spacetime hole argument. However, I like to argue that
one does not necessarily need a second step. At least for the case of principal bundles the first
step of the argument is already sufficient. Thus, interestingly, one does not need a proper hole
argument in this case.
6.1 Generalized hole argument: First step
Consider the usual gauge freedom arising in any gauge theory T . Thus, T admits gauge trans-
formations GT1 : T → T ′ and GT2b : T (x) → T ′(x) such that T and T ′ resp. T (x) and T ′(x)
are Leibniz equivalent. In other words, only gauge invariant quantities are observable. In order
to make empirical use of T , it is necessary to fix a gauge. This is evidently just a conventional
operation, such as introducing coordinates. The gauge by its own nature has no significant
physical meaning. Surely, the substantivalist will not deny this, but he will nevertheless insist
on the ontological individuality of points in spaces in which the gauge is applied.
As demonstrated, the Earman-Norton hole argument makes a decisive use of an active
interpretation of the considered transformations as point transformations instead of passive
coordinate transformations. In order to take over the argument I shall refer to GT2b as point
transformations in the group manifold of G. This reflects the very nature of the fiber spaces in
the framework of a principal bundle P: The right action of G on P leads to the fibration of the
bundle, i.e. G-orbits (fibers) are equivalence classes of physically indistinguishable states. Here,
a crucial point arises: Since the fiber space is the group itself, its points have per definition
no significant physical meaning as entities per se. One can see this by recalling the idea of
true for the connection forms, i.e. the gauge fields, of general relativity, is of course a matter of a more detailed
analysis and interpretation of the theory’s underlying gauge structure. In the light of the few remarks at the end
of section 4, I like to assume this to be the case: Gauge fields of gravity – as well as their derived properties
such as curvature – live primarily in the fibers. They are constituted by actual transformations of local reference
frames. Speaking about the curvature of the manifold, though, appears from the gauge theoretic point of view as
a conventional maneuver due to the fact that fiber and base space are soldered. Surely, a detailed discussion of
this topic remains to be a further task.
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thinking about Lie groups in terms of their parameter manifolds. This leads to a most natural
representation: the Lie group as its own homogeneous space, thus, the group acting transitively
on itself. From this point of view we are forced to primarily interpret the abstract group in
terms of its algebraic rather than its analytic structure, which seems to be the natural way of an
application of Lie groups within the framework of principal bundles. Therefore – since gauge
fields just take values in the group – merely a relationalist’s interpretation of the group’s natural
homogeneous representation space holds: no points are distinguished, and, moreover, no group
space point has any physical significance whatsoever. It is indeed the key idea of gauge theories
that only relations of gauge transformations within different fibers, given by the connection
forms, have any empirical meaning.
Beside the structure of principal bundles P, gauge theories make use of their associated
vector bundles E as well. How to proceed with their fiber spaces? Clearly, it is one and the
same abstract group G which constitutes the fibers of P and acts on the vector space fibers of E.
The matter field ‘lives’ in the latter ones and is thereby just a representation of G in some vector
space.10 Matter fields transform according to local gauge transformations GT2a. In section 4, I
gave an interpretation of GT2a as inherently active transformations, namely, a local change of a
matter field at some point p compared to a different point p′ in spacetime changes the physical
situation, i.e. constitutes an interaction represented as a gauge field. Changing the physical
situation can be understood as the general meaning of transformations considered to be active.
Note however, that this does not necessarily refer to active point transformations (of spaces
whatsoever). Actually, in stressing local gauge transformations being actively interpreted, we
are by no means forced to consider them as point transformations – they rather represent active
changes of general state space reference frames. The vector bundle substantivalist, however, will
consider local gauge transformations GT2a as active point transformations in the vector space
fibers. The relationalist’s arguments must then prove this point of view to be untenable.
However, as we will see now, the mere representation of G in the vector space fibers of E
does not allow for the same argument to rule out vector bundle substantivalism as for the group
manifold fibers of P. The gauge fixing mentioned above acts in the vector space as distinguishing
a certain basis. Again, this is a pure conventional maneuver: only local changes of state space
reference frames have a physical meaning. But, the substantivalist may still claim that vector
space points are entities per se, since gauge fixing is related to a mere passive operation such
as choosing coordinates. Here, the relationalist has to accept that representing the bundle’s
structure group in a vector space is not reason enough to derive a pure relational status of such
a space, simply because the group theoretic argument as in the principal bundle case above does
not apply.
Thus, the first step of the generalized argument is only sufficient to rule out principal fiber
bundle substantivalism, since these fiber spaces are, unlike base manifolds or any kind of vector
spaces, group manifolds, i.e. spaces in which the structure group is homogeneously represented
on itself. Regardless of the question about an approriate active interpretation of local gauge
transformations, I see no way to individuate the points of such kinds of spaces. With regard to
vector bundle fiber spaces, our mere mathematical tools, however, do still allow a substantival-
ist’s viewpoint - even if this position turns out to be absurdly extreme. We can make this clear
10E.g., each component ψi of the Dirac bispinor ψ gives a fundamental representation of U(1) in C.
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by emphasizing an inherent fundamental conventionalism in any gauge physics: we must fix a
gauge in order to make empirical use of a gauge theory. This clearly indicates (but does not
prove) that fiber space points are physically indistinguishable and non-individuated because of
our freedom of choosing a particular gauge.
6.2 Generalized hole argument: Second step
I shall now confront ‘hard core substantivalists’, who are still not convinced, with the proper
version of the generalized hole argument. For this purpose, I will consider bundle isomorphisms
instead of base manifold diffeomorphisms. Recall the following commutative diagram:
E
φ
−→ E′
pi ↓ ↓ pi′
M
f
−→ M′
(20)
If φ is a diffeomorphism, we may call it a bundle isomorphism. Per definition, bundle iso-
morphisms preserve the fiber structure of the bundle. In particular, φ : E → E is a bundle
automorphism. It can be read from the diagram that any bundle isomorphism uniquely induces
a manifold diffeomorphism f :M→M′.
I shall now choose an appropriate “hole isomorphism τ”11. To begin with, one simply might
use a bundle isomorphism which induces the hole manifold diffeomorphism (19) – this already
would be sufficient. But one may even think about a most general hole isomorphism
τ = id, t ≤ to, and τ 6= id, t > to. (21)
In this way we are able to perfectly take over the second step of the hole argument: Since for
the fiber space substantivalist the action of τ changes the ‘real’ arrangement of bundle space
points, i.e. the physical situation, the world splits again into different models, thus, leading to
indeterminism.
Note that this kind of indeterminism has nothing to do with the type of indeterminism arising
in quantum theories (and, thus, in quantum gauge field theories). The Dirac-Maxwell or,
in general, Yang-Mills field equations, which govern the temporal development of the fields
are strict deterministic field equations. Therefore, the existence of symmetry properties of the
fields such as bundle morphisms are clearly not related to indeterminism arising in the quantum
measurement process.
Hence, it should have become clear from the above arguments that there is no possibility left
for the substantivalist to hold his position, since the proper use of bundle isomorphisms in the
generalized hole argument rules out fiber bundle substantivalism in the same manner as base
manifold diffeomorphisms rule out manifold substantivalism. Moreover, since it can be argued
that the second part of the argument is not necessary at least in the principal bundle case, the
substantivalist’s possible escape into indeterminism is even more eroded. Thus, one ends up
with a clear result: Fiber bundles refer to a relationalistic interpretation.
11There is no Greek counterpart of the letter ‘h’ – the reader may guess why ‘τ ’ is chosen instead ...
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7 The meaning of gauging?
Once again, the idea of an active interpretation of local gauge transformations refers to the
active relational change of reference frames of the matter fields. This considerably changes the
physical situation, whereas the idea of actively shifting fiber space points remains without any
empirical meaning because of these points being genuinly a representation of a group. Due
to the gauge principle gauge fields appear to be a consequence and, thus, a mere appendix of
the matter fields. This is another way of arguing that the notion of a matter free spacetime
is without any empirical meaning. Since we must regard the gauge principle as a tremendous
successful heuristic principle in modern theoretical physics, the more so we should be puzzled
with the unsolved philosophical question concerning the meaning of this principle. Until today it
still remains a pure miracle why the postulate of local gauge transformations, i.e. replacing the
transformation parameters αs → αs(x), leads to the coupling of matter and interaction fields.
It seems quite clear that hand waving arguments such as “field physics has to be local,
therefore the transformations must be local”, which one finds throughout the textbook literature,
are philosophically by no means satisfying. Maybe, the curious interplay between global and
local considerations in the gauge approach gives us a hint for considering new ideas of spacetime
– not referring to it as being primarily a differentiable manifold (Lyre 1998). But these questions
touch the deep conceptual roots of physics in general. At this stage, the real puzzle begins and
therefore a lot of work needs to be done by physicists as well as philosophers of physics to find
the true meaning of gauging.
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